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A Review of Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese 
State 
 
By Andres Freeman 
 
Xinjiang is located in Central Eurasia, and is a culturally diverse 
conduit for trade in ideas, technology, religion, and biology 
throughout Eurasia. In the last three centuries, borders have 
become more sharply defined by the and Qing-Muscovite empires, 
especially after the toppling of the Dzungar Empire, which isolated 
the nomadic and semi-sedentarized: Kazaks, Dungun, Turkic-
Speaking people, Uyghur, Oriats and Khalkha Mongols, to their 
periphery. The Northern region, which is proximal to Russia, is 
rich in mineral wealth, while the central pasturelands keep 
nomadic herds alive, and the southern portion serves as the 
agricultural basin, along with its oil supply located in the central 
Tarim Basin. As Moscow and Beijing grew their states, and the 
race for oil was on between the U.S. and Europe in the Middle 
East, Xinjiang served as the Sino-Russo chess board, where each 
agitated in the others disenfranchised Central Asian minorities. It is 
with the factors aforementioned that the common people of 
Xinjiang’s ethnic-elites, where agents caught primarily between 
Moscow and Beijing, as they wrestled to maintain ethnic populist 
control in Xinjiang’s political, as well as socio-economic 
participation.  
 Ethno-populism shaped Xinjiang’s political climate from 
the late Qing Empire, until present day, which offers some insight 
on the complexities of political discourse and policy, regarding 
China’s Uighur population. This review of Justin Jacobs’ Xinjiang 
and the Modern Chinese State is limited in detail due to the 
immensity of Eurasia’s complex history and symbiotic 
relationships regarding state building across the continent, which 
fall outside of this works scope, but should not deter scholars 
engaging with the intricate details Jacobs work covers. It is flexible 
enough to connect many common, misinformed nationalist 






global trend of repressive measures the people of Central Asia 
experienced in the twentieth century. Though the work could use 
more personal accounts from non-elites in Xinjiang, it links the 
particular insight that political, or military leaders, bring as far as 
on the ground experiences in governorship, to the three eras 
covered. Historians and social scientists should familiarize 
themselves with this source material, at least as a baseline 
understanding, of the Uyghur discussion in modern Chinese 
Eurasian history. 
 Since the nineteenth century, competitive state building in 
Europe, permeating ideas of self-determination, which often are 
followed by the exploitation of ethnic differences amongst 
interrelating corporate groups and authority figures, shocked the 
world including China. In Xinjiang, the political strategy during 
the end of the Qing Imperial Dynasty (1644-1911), the Republican 
Period (1912-1949) and the People Republic of China era of the 
Chinese Communist Party (1949-present), are similarly 
characteristic of other frontier colonial campaigns. As such, ethno-
populist politics have continually hindered the respective eras 
process of reconciliation with colonialisms permeation through 
Beijing's progressive policy and continually widens the socio-
political gap between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities in China. 
Each respective era of Xinjiang’s governors employs ethno-
populist policies as strategy, by utilizing ethnic-elites and 
corporate groups, to garner popular political support in maintaining 
Han dominance of the region. In addition, the methodology, along 
with the ideological approach, changes with geopolitical strategy 
in mind. Jacobs doesn’t directly express the role that western 
conquest for oil brought the global economy, but does explain the 
strategic interest for Russia in Xinjiang, which is linked to the 
political motivations that carried the global community through a 
brutal multi-century war, for control of the global economy. 
Jacobs’s main point is that the findings of his research indicate a 
snafu in the semantics of the nation state model. To Jacobs, China 
should be referred to as a National Empire because of its lack of 






distinct model from the Soviet model of a Nation of Empires, and 
by focusing on the geopolitical climate during the three eras of 
governors in Xinjiang, his examples illuminate the significance 
that Han chauvinism plays in creating tension between Beijing and 
the capital Urumqi. 
 Jacobs is a historian of modern China who authored 
Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State and currently teaches at 
American University, where he teaches courses on modern China, 
East Asian civilization, Indiana Jones in History, and the Japanese 
Empire. His research concerns the northwestern Chinese 
borderlands, comparative Eurasian empires, and the historical 
politics of archaeological expeditions. His background of study 
puts his research dead in the middle of strategically significant 
regions of Central Asia and gives a platform to correlate the geo-
political watershed events, as an explanation for the collision and 
aftershock in Xinjiang.  
  Governor Yang Zengxin was a Han ruler of non-Han 
people first and foremost, from 1912-28, however his brand of 
ethnic-populist policy was continued from Qing era bureaucratic 
structures that his frontier experience was steepened in, leaving 
him a better understanding of how to govern the frontier as 
opposed to Han-Manchu officials in Beijing, during the Republic 
era. To avoid creating another outer Mongolia, Yang requested less 
aggressive tactics from Beijing, and to send arms so that the 
predominantly Uyghur and Kazak people of the regions could 
govern its borders, before the Soviets offered a sweeter deal. Yang 
postured as a defender of non-Han interest, while warding off 
competition with the Bolshevik encouraged ideas of self-
determination. Ensuring Han rule of traditionally non-Han land 
was ultimately Yang's motivation for his request for arms, though 
it was not received as such by Beijing. Yang’s tenure in 1924 when 
he had Sino-Muslim General of Xinjiang’s Kashgar district, Ma 
Fuxiang, killed for his involvement in conspiring to assassinate 
him illustrates his character. Instead of bidding on the behalf of 
disenfranchised non-Han people who popularly supported such 






him as the cause, subsequently brushing over the totality of 
growing discontent in Xinjiang. Ma was installed to prevent 
British, Japanese, and Russian agitation in the Mongol population, 
but soon began to favor the Soviets, over the Han-Chauvinists, or 
the former Qing Government, which prompted Yang to exploit this 
dynamic for his own political gain.  
 The competition between Bolshevik Russia and China 
during the republican period influenced many of the ethnic-elite 
partnerships, that were a continuation of ethno-populist policy, 
weakening Beijing's already brittle claim of Xinjiang as part of 
China under the auspices of Zhonghua Minzu, especially in the 
city of Ili. Sheng Shikai used Soviet Style Nationalism to patronize 
Uyghur Nationalist, in part by giving the non-Han people a limited 
political platform. In one of Xinjiang’s more Soviet friendly 
regions, there was a monopoly over the extraction of the 
province’s agricultural and mineral wealth, which is why in (1934-
1937) the U.S.S.R. shelled out an 8 million dollar investment, to 
garner popular support from the Turkic speakers, Mongol and 
other non-Hans in the region. The relationship diminished because 
of the implanting of a Russian consulate in China's Kazak 
inhabited Ili, which resulted in the soviet backed Ili Rebellion 
(1944), where a coalition government rose from East Turkistani 
separatist (ETIM), who were brutally put down by the Kuomintang 
nationalist party. The ETIM were a party who called for national 
sovereignty from China, with support from primarily Western 
powers through Xinjiang’s exiles, and Taiwan, following the 
Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power. The competitive 
relationship between the two shifted as China strayed away from 
the Austro-Marxism, where the ideological restructuring put 
loyalty to the Chinese state above the Soviet model, which in 
combination with agitation of Kazaks and Uyghurs, marked the 
early years of Sino-Soviet estrangement.  
 Jacobs points out that the Chinese Communist Party used 
ethno-populist control via affirmative action as an extension of 
ethno-populist political strategy, where politically charged Han 






political power from the splintered separatist. In designating 
Xinjiang, a special Autonomous region, the CCP crippled 
minorities route of autonomous political participation by diluting 
the concentration of non-Hans and removed the platform for 
organic leadership to thrive. The shift in Beijing’s relation to 
Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, also kept the exiled separatist out, 
facing the difficult position of fighting their way into the state, as 
opposed to Autonomy. Jacobs uses his concept of National Empire 
to explain why policy in Xinjiang unfolded as it did, however, in 
the context to geo-politics and strategy, serves a joint purpose of 
having a larger presence to offset Beijing’s past neglect, and to 
limit the influence of Europeans who had been agitating in the 
region since the Opium Wars. Regardless of stance, the people of 
Xinjiang endured the brunt of any adverse effects, as elites and 
middlemen used their client relationships, during the early years of 
the Cold War.  
 In current day 2020, the condition of the Uyghur’s of 
Xinjiang has been a critical question posed by human rights groups 
and media outlets, most of which are western based or associated 
to the U.S. in a geo-economic client capacity. Correspondence with 
strong criticism of Beijing of holding Uighur’s in detention camps, 
often characterizes them Holocaust era concentration camps, 
subsequently ignoring anti-Semitism being a European 
phenomenon and the direct support of brutal Israeli occupation of 
Palestine in line with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Washington’s 
stance is not surprising, the Bush administration brandished the 
Eastern Turkistani Independence Movement a terrorist 
organization in 2002, which served two significant roles related to 
this reading: the application of Neoconservative foreign policy 
through the Bush Doctrine, as outlined in U.S. Plan for New 
American Century, and facilitating a mutual benefit of not having 
to address campaigns in Central Asia, which would implicate the 
U.S. Global War on Terror Campaign on Afghanistan as a Geo-
strategic imperial venture. With this dynamic in mind, it is also 
important to recognize the role globalization plays in state-to-state 






each other and what these borderlands mean in terms of the Geo-
strategy of economic warfare into the twenty-first century. 
 The US dollar is used to buy oil products in the world 
market, where it funds its ventures by storing the excess printed 
money in other countries' national reserves, which hides inflation 
on its end and ensures the direct exchange in petrodollars, whose 
value is supported by other countries’ use of the USD. In other 
words, the other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, buy our debt, 
which clears us up to continue state building ventures, but allows 
the U.S. to impose brutal sanctions on “non-compliance,” or 
trading without the USD. Recently, Russia, China, Iran, and 
Venezuela, to name a few, are already working on moving away 
from the USD, due to the effect the harsh sanctions have on their 
economies. This is significant because the energy crisis that 
plagued the twentieth century is the root cause for western interest 
in the Middle East and Central Eurasia, into the twenty-first 
century.  
 The Russo-Afghan War kept Beijing isolated into the Deng 
era, while bleeding the Soviet Union to its collapse, where the 
liberalization campaigns and subsequent globalization facilitated 
the infiltration of the U.S and Britain’s intelligence agencies into 
strategic locations such as Tibet, where Taiwan became a major 
point of Western involvement in agitating near large Uyghur exile 
communities. Though many of the reports pertaining to Xinjiang 
are questionable at best, it is beneficial for the Uyghur community 
to be acknowledged and its reports of abuse to be validated: the 
lack of an ability to engage in representational politics removes 
actual autonomy in Xinjiang and is clearly a product of centuries 
of pacified reconciliation with Qing Imperial expansion. Jacobs 
argues ethno-elitist/ethno-populist pacification makes China a 
National Empire, which I believe suggests the Uyghur’s of 
Xinjiang have not been afforded a true chance at autonomy. As 
proxy conflict functions, the decisions large states make, have real 
and oftentimes tragic effects for the inhabitants whose everyday 
lives are in direct contact with bullets flying overhead, as opposed 






distant from the shockwaves of warfare. The research presented in 
Jacobs work should be carried forward into a mainstream 
discussion, that facilitates a clean break in dialogue from orientalist 
interpretations of history, which often parade around Islamophobic 
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